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Abstract
Threat analysis of voting systems is an increasing field of interest.
While it is important to verify the system itself, it has been found that cer-
tain vulnerabilities only become apparent when taking a “system-based”
view, i.e. considering interactions between the various components of a
scheme. In this paper we apply a model for system-based analysis [22] to
carry out a systematic threat analysis of the ThreeBallot voting system
[18] and Preˆt a` Voter [8].
1 Introduction
There has been much progress in developing high assurance, verifiable voting
systems. Ideally, there should be minimal reliance on the players, i.e. vot-
ers, election officials, etc., and technical components, such as the hardware and
software behaving as intended. Notable examples are Preˆt a` Voter [8], Punch-
scan [3], and VoteHere [4], all of which aim to provide a high degree of trans-
parency in the system. While cryptography is often used to enable verifiability
without compromising voter privacy, Rivest has shown with the ThreeBallot
voting system that this is not, in fact, an absolute necessity [18].
Recently, interest has grown in analysis techniques to ensure that voting
systems meet election requirements, such as eligibility, coercion-resistance and
accuracy. In [13] Karlof et al. carried out a system-based analysis of Chaum’s
visual crypto scheme [7] and Neff’s scheme [16, 15], identifying potential threats
such as subliminal channels and “social-engineering”-style attacks. In a similar
analysis, Ryan et al. [20] showed that Preˆt a` Voter [8] is robust against many
of the threats mentioned in [13], but identified further possible vulnerabilities
such as chain-voting and authority knowledge.
By considering the interactions between the various components in the above
analyses new threats were identified. Although highly useful, this type of anal-
ysis did not consider the interactions systematically and hence, may not have
uncovered all the possible threats. A more formal analysis of a voting proto-
col [17, 14] on the other hand may be more systematic, but is limited to the
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technical core of the protocol. Another approach is to develop a “catalogue of
threats” [1], aside from [2] there is little work to date in this direction.
In [22], we proposed a model for analysis of threats in voting systems that
is essentially “system-based”, but considerably more systematic than previous
similar work [13, 20]. While [2] has a largely technical focus and concentrates
on DRE systems, our model operates at a higher level of abstraction and is not
scheme-specific.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present a short
overview of the model, in Section 3-4 and 5-6 we apply the model to carry out
a system-based analysis of the ThreeBallot voting scheme and Preˆt a` Voter,
respectively. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss the main results of the anlysis.
2 A Model for System-Based Analysis of Voting
Systems
The model presented in [22] defines a set of components and associated threat
categories to those components. The model was developed in a stepwise manner,
where we first introduced a base model for a simple manual voting system, such
as the one currently used in the U.K. We then extended the base model to
include various features, such as a voting device, paper audit trail, verifiable
receipts, etc. The threat categories to each component were determined by
looking at the direct threats that could violate the purpose and requirements
of a component. When deciding whether a threat category applies or not, it
is important to consider the details of the particular scheme and how a threat
may be manifested.
When using the model, the main components of a scheme such as the ballot
form, voting booth, etc. are identified and the possible threats to each compo-
nent at each phase of the protocol are considered in turn. In this way, it provides
a guideline for evaluation of the system with the detail of a protocol-level anal-
ysis, but at the same time taking interactions between the various components
directly into consideration. An advantage of the model apart from offering a
more systematic approach to analysis, is that the components can be selected
as appropriate and thus tailored to the scheme being analysed. In addition,
by working through the threat categories in the model, and at the same time
applying reasoning as appropriate to the scheme, the analyst is arguably better
able to identify new threats than if using a catalogue of threats.
The model was designed to be as general as possible, so that it can be used
for a range of different systems: from manual, paper-based voting, such as the
current UK system, to more sophisticated systems that make use of, e.g. voting
devices and verifiable receipts.
The possible threats associated with each component are given in Figures 1
- 8. Note that for all components in the model, the property violated is listed
alongside each threat. Here, we consider the main properties required of secure
systems, i.e., confidentiality, integrity and availability, rather than the tradi-
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tional requirements of voting systems such as ballot secrecy, accuracy, verifia-
bility, etc [14, 10].
Threat Property violated
Identifiable information added by voter/official
Voter identifiable from ballot form
Authority knowledge Confidentiality
Voter’s choice incorrectly represented
Ballot form spoiled Integrity
Ballot form faked
Figure 1: Ballot form
Threat Property violated
Voter’s activity monitored Confidentiality
Voter records own choice
Voter’s choice influenced Integrity
Voter smuggles out unmarked ballot form
Figure 2: Voting booth
Threat Property violated
Ballot stuffing Integrity
Ballot spoiling
Figure 3: Ballot storage
Note that the model does not include certain threats such as forced absten-
tion due to shortage of election equipment, complex registration, etc., as these
are generally due to forces outside the system and need to be addressed by
means other than improvements in the protocol.
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Threat Property violated
Early publishing Integrity
Absence of verifiability
False/erroneous count
Figure 4: Election results
Threat Property Violated
Identifiable information added Confidentiality
Voter’s activity monitored
Faulty authorisation Integrity
Voter’s choice incorrectly/not recorded
Denial of service Availability
Figure 5: Voting device
Threat Property violated
Voter identifiable from receipt Confidentiality
Voter’s choice noted by official
Mismatch between voter’s choice and paper copy Integrity
Figure 6: Paper audit trail
Threat Potential threat
Voter identifiable from receipt
Authority knowledge Confidentiality
Receipt discarded/ surrendered Integrity
Invalid signature
Faked receipt
Figure 7: Verifiable receipt
Threat Potential threats
Monitoring access to the Web bulletin board (WBB) Confidentiality
Voter presented with fake WBB Integrity
WBB modified
Denial of service Availability
Figure 8: WBB
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3 Threat Analysis Case Study: The ThreeBallot
Voting System
3.1 Outline of the ThreeBallot Voting System
We now present an outline of the ThreeBallot voting system, for details see
[18]. ThreeBallots is a verifiable paper-based voting system. Contrary to other
verifiable voting systems, such as Preˆt a` Voter and PunchScan no encryption
is used to provide voter verifiability, allowing a new level of transparency. In
the following we describe the setup of the election. A voter votes using a multi-
ballot, which consists of three individual ballots separated by perforated lines.
Note that three single ballots together also could act as a multi-ballot. Each
ballot lists the candidate choices together with a “bubble” for each candidate,
and a ballot ID printed at the bottom of the ballot, see Figure 9.
Trym
Loki
Trym
Loki
 Ballot  Ballot  Ballot
Odin
Thor
Trym
Loki
Odin
Thor
Odin
Thor
1503198330111979 45140852
Figure 9: An example of a multi-ballot
A multi-ballot must be marked according to specific rules defined by the
ThreeBallot voting system. In the privacy of the voting booth the voter fills
in exactly one bubble for each candidate, and fills in an extra bubble for the
candidate(s) she prefers. After the voter has marked her multi-ballot, it is
passed through a checker machine that optically scans the multi-ballot and
verifies that the three ballots together have been correctly filled out according
to the ThreeBallot voting system’s rules. There should be exactly one mark
for each of the non-chosen candidates, while there should be exactly two marks
for the chosen candidate(s). If the multi-ballot is properly formed, the checker
device prints a “red stripe” at the bottom of each ballot, to prove that the
ballots have been successfully verified. The checker machine also lets the voter
randomly choose a copy of one of the three ballots, to retain as a receipt. The
receipt can later be used to verify that this part of the voter’s multi-ballot
has been correctly registered at the public Web bulletin board (WBB). While
the three ballots together prove the voter’s choice, the receipt does not give
away any information about how the voter voted. After the checker machine
has verified the multi-ballot, the voter casts her three ballots to the ballot box
in the presence of a voter official. Each ballot is then scanned and posted to
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the WBB. Tallying is straightforward, the number of marks for each candidate
are added up, and the result for each candidate is obtained by subtracting the
number of voters from each candidate total (since each voter adds a mark for
the candidates she votes against). Anyone can verify the final tally from the
WBB.
From the brief description above we identify the use of the following com-
ponents in the ThreeBallot voting system: ballot form, voting booth, electronic
device (checker machine), verifiable receipt, ballot box (ballot storage compo-
nent), WBB and election results. In the following we analyse the threats to
each of the components.
4 Threat Analysis of ThreeBallots
4.1 Ballot form
• Identifiable information added by voter/official: A voter could mark her
three ballots in an identifying way, to later prove the triplet of ballots
used to cast the vote. Similarly, a dishonest election official could add
identifying marks to a multi-ballot, e.g. during ballot generation. A coun-
termeasure against the latter attack, which is mentioned in [18], is to only
print single ballots and let the voter pick three ballots randomly. In [18]
no method is described with respect to how the ballots are scanned to
the WBB. If, for example only the ballot ID and the index values of the
corresponding candidate marks are registered at the WBB, it would be
very difficult for a voter to prove her vote by adding identifying marks to
the ballots. On the other hand, only registering a representation of the
original ballots may open up for more errors, although such errors should
be detected e.g. by a helper organisation or the voters themselves with
high probability.
• Voter identifiable from ballot form: The ThreeBallot voting system is
vulnerable to the “Italian attack”, i.e. an attack where the coercer makes
the voter vote for a selection of candidates that most likely will be unique.
The three ballots can then be identified later at the WBB. A prerequisite
for the attack is that there is a sufficient number of candidates to choose
from, such that unique candidate selections can be made.
In [18] no method for separating the ballots is described. The patterns of
tearing may reveal the three ballots forming a multi-ballot. However, it
will be very time consuming for an election official to physically go through
all the ballots to identify corresponding ballots.
A voter could prove her vote by writing down, memorizing or taking pho-
tos of the ballot IDs of the ballots forming the valid triple. If in addition
the voter makes the ballot IDs known to the coercer before the WBB
phase, the coercer will be quite certain of how the voter voted. A counter-
measure mentioned in [18] is to use ballot IDs that are hard to memorize.
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However, there is a trade-off between making the ballot IDs difficult to re-
member and making the scheme less transparent, since verification against
the WBB is made harder. Another possible mitigation is the “Shamos
checker”, which prevents the voter from learning the ballot IDs of the two
ballots not chosen as receipts. A brief description of the Shamos checker
is as follows:
– If the multi-ballot is valid, 3 random ballot IDs are generated, with-
out being shown to the voter. The voter selects one of the ballots to
retain as a receipt.
– The ballots that are not selected are put into a holding bin, while
the machine produces the ballot selected as the receipt.
– A voter can then verify that her receipt is identical to the selected
ballot. If this is not the case, the “I got a bad receipt” button could
be pressed, and the ballots in the holding bin will be put into a
spoiled ballot bucket. Otherwise, the ballots in the holding bin will
be put into the ballot box.
Although the voter is not able to remember the ballot IDs of the two other
ballots, new threats may be introduced. The machine could learn the
correspondences between ballot IDs and ballots or could choose ballot IDs
such that they can be easily correlated later. Another possible weakness is
protection of the spoiled ballot box. Spoiled ballots could for instance be
substituted with the ballot the checker produces to the voter. The voter
could also refuse to put the last ballot into the ballot box, in order to steal
votes from the other candidates.
• Authority knowledge: Election officials may learn the correspondences
between ballot IDs of the three ballots forming the multi-ballot during
ballot construction. As mentioned before, printing of separate ballot forms
is one possible countermeasure. Another possibility mentioned in [18] is to
let the voters pick ballot IDs from a bucket of stickers. A dishonest election
official could learn the correspondence of ballot IDs when ensuring that
the voter casts excatly three ballots. This could be envisaged as a “social
engineering” type attack, in which a voter who has not understood the
importance of not revealing the ballot IDs, could be tricked into revealing
them. Voter education is important to ensure the voters’ understanding
of the system.
• Voter’s choice incorrectly represented: A dishonest voter or election official
could try to add or remove marks, after the ballots have been verified by
the checker machine. This may or may not be detected during verification
of the final tally, depending on the extent of the manipulation. It would,
for instance, be quite obvious if the total number of votes for a particular
candidate was more than the number of voters, or if a candidate has a
negative number of votes. However, the attack cannot be traced without
violating voter privacy. Checksums calculated over the original marked
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ballot is mentioned as a possible countermeasure. On the other hand,
this would require a more complex checker device, which may be more
vulnerable to tampering.
• Ballot form spoiled: An election official could mark a ballot in order to
invalidate it (if a checksum scheme is used), or physically destroy a ballot
form. If one of the three ballots belonging to a voter is modified, the
voter will detect it with a probability of 1/3, provided she checks her re-
ceipt against the WBB. Thus, it would be difficult for a dishonest voting
official to carry out any substantial ballot spoiling attacks without detec-
tion, given that voters are dilligent in checking their receipts against the
WBB. However, tracing the attacks to the dishonest election official may
be difficult, so this could be a way of launching a DoS attack.
• Ballot form faked: An interesting point is the level of authentication pro-
vided by the “red stripe” printed by the checker machine to prove that
the ballots have been correctly formed. Given a set of valid ballots, a
dishonest voter/election official may be able to fake the stripe and cast
illegally formed multi-ballots. In the ThreeBallots scheme the names of all
the voters and all the ballots (3n if there are n voters) are posted to the
WBB. Therefore, ballot faking attacks may be detected, but not necessar-
ily traced. Although this approach allows public scrutiny of who voted, it
may make forced abstention attacks easier to carry out.
4.2 Voting booth
• Voter’s activity monitored: As for all schemes that require a polling sta-
tion, a camera in the booth is a threat. Shoulder surfing may be more diffi-
cult than for other schemes, since the representation of the voter’s choices
is more complex. The candidates the voter votes against are marked once,
while the voter’s candidate choice has exactly two marks, a quick glance
may therefore not immediately reveal how the voter voted.
• Voter records own choice: The voter could use a camera phone to record
her vote, for example.
• Voter’s choice influenced: There could be a subliminal message in the
booth to pesuade the voter to vote for one of the candidates, for instance.
Note that the above threats to the voting booth component would be
present in almost any scheme, but should nevertheless be evaluated in an
analysis.
• Voter smuggles out unmarked ballot form: A chain voting attack could be
initiated if a voter smuggles out an unmarked ballot form. The coercer can
then confirm how the voter votes by checking the ballot IDs at the WBB.
Note that if the ballot ID stickers approach is used, the stickers could also
be smuggled out, so the coercer could control the voters’ behaviour.
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4.3 Ballot storage
• Ballot stuffing: It is assumed that a voter casts exactly three properly
formed ballots. A voter violating this rule could, for instance, cast only
two ballots where only the marks for the desired candidate are included
and discard the last ballot which contains the mandatory marks for the
other candidates. The scheme does not specify a method to ensure that
the voter casts exactly three ballots. An enforcement of this rule should
preserve voter privacy as well.
A voter or dishonest election official may be able to add extra votes to a
multi-ballot if the checker malfunctions. Another threat is a voter who
verifies two multi-ballots through the checker, and combines these to one
“badly” formed ballot. It should be very difficult to pass more than one
ballot through the checker, e.g. with election officials closely observing
the process, or authentication mechanisms implemented in the device.
Two voters could, however, bypass this by colluding to cast one illegal
vote. This could proceed in the following way: each voter gets a properly
formed multi-ballot verified by the checker, the first voter smuggles out the
multi-ballot, while the second voter combines the two legal ballots to form
an illegal ballot. This will be more effective than casting two legitimate
votes, as they can construct a vote that, for example, gives three marks
for their candidate and none for the others. The net effect is therefore
that they loose one mark for their desired candidate, but steal two marks
from the other candidates. Figure 10 illustrates how two legally formed
ballots could be combined to form an illegal multi-ballot; for purpose of
illustration we have chosen some easily recognisable ballot IDs.
A possible countermeasure, could involve the checker machine printing
three equal images or identifiers on the back of the ballots (chosen ran-
domly from a large set) and adding a perforated line above the images.
The voter then proceeds to an election authority who verifies that the im-
ages are equal to each other and tears them off. The voter can then cast
her ballots to the ballot box. This procedure would also ensure that the
voter casts exactly three ballots. However, it may introduce more threats
by adding an extra layer of complexity to the scheme.
• Ballot spoiling: The ballot box could e.g. be destroyed or replaced with one
containing fake ballots, but voters will detect such attacks if they verify
their receipts against the WBB. In [18] the use of “helper organisations”
(e.g. the League of Women Voters) is envisaged as an additional help to
verify WBB integrity.
4.4 Election results
• Early publishing: A threat to early publishing in ThreeBallots is the fact
that by simply tallying the marks for each candidate on the voters’ receipts
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Figure 10: Creating an illegal multi-ballot
one can get an indication of who is winning the election at that partic-
ular polling place. This threat was pointed out to us through personal
correspondence with Roberto Samarone Arau´jo, Ricardo Felipe Custo´dio
and Jeroen van de Graaf. A prerequisite for the attack is that voters are
willing to show their receipts to some organisation that is awaiting people
at the polling station. Given that voters mark their candidate choice in a
random pattern and randomly choose one of the ballots to copy, to retain
as a receipt, there is a risk that a statistical analysis will reveal which
candidate is winning the race. This has also been confirmed through sim-
ulations carried out by Arau´jo et al.
• Absence of verifiability: Vulnerabilities covered under WBB and encrypted
receipts.
• False/erroneous counts: This is not a significant threat due to the trans-
parency of the scheme. All ballots are posted to the WBB, so that anyone
can calculate and verify the final tally. This is a huge advantage compared
to traditional paper based schemes and the verification is easier to under-
stand for the average voter, than the mix net or homomorphic approach
used in encrypted receipt schemes.
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4.5 Voting device
• Identifiable information added: A checker could encode information about
which ballots belong with each other, e.g. in the way the red lines are
printed onto the ballots. Testing that the checker device is properly cali-
brated both before and during the election is a possible countermeasure.
• Voter’s activity monitored: A malicious program inserted into the device
could register information about the ballots and record sequence numbers.
Another threat is a wireless component in the device which communicates
to the outside, so the voter using the device could be linked with the
information passed through the checker, i.e. a voter’s choices.
• Faulty authorisation: Not a threat, as the voter’s credentials are not au-
thorised by the checker machine. However, ensuring that the voter only
gets to check one multiple-ballot through the checker is a possible mitiga-
tion against ballot stuffing attacks.
• Voter’s choice incorrectly/not recorded: A malicious checker could, for
example add extra marks to the ballots on the chance that the voter does
not notice. A malicious checker could also allow improperly formed ballot
forms. However, this would require prior knowledge about the checker or
the possibility that a voter could modify the checker machine. Due to
the simplicity of the checker device, threats arising from bad interface or
failure of machine features intended to assist the voter are not particular
threats to the scheme. The checker device only verifies that the ballots
have been filled in according to the rules of the ThreeBallot voting system.
However, a more complex checker may introduce such vulnerabilities.
• Denial of Service: A machine breakdown is not a threat to this scheme, as
it is to DREs, where the votes are stored in the machines memory. There
is less risk of losing votes, but voters should be prevented from voting
until a new electronic device is found, to ensure that only properly formed
ballot forms are cast.
4.6 Verifiable receipt
• Voter identifiable from receipt: Randomisation attacks are not a particular
threat, since the voter can fill out the receipt according to the coercer’s
wishes, but still trick the coercer in the way the two corresponding ballots
are filled out.
• Authority knowledge: Kleptographic attacks are not a particular threat, as
the scheme does not make any use of cryptography. One possibility could
be to encode information into the ballot ID number, e.g. a specific hash
function computed over a ballot ID might reveal which ballots correspond
to each other. Printing of single ballots, where the voter picks three single
ballots randomly would counter this threat. An interesting vote buying
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attack is described in [6],in which the voter can effectively sell parts of
her ability to verify her vote. The coercer pays or intimidates voters to
construct receipts that only contain a mark for one candidate, e.g. Thor.
If a sufficient number of people are coerced, the coercer will then have a
higher probability of getting away with changing votes from say Odin to
Thor, as these ballots do not constitute receipts.
• Receipt discarded/surrendered: May indicate receipts that will not be
checked.
• Invalid signature: A possible threat if the checker does not sign the receipt
properly, or the signature verifier does not work properly. The voter would
then be unable to convince the system that she has been disenfranchised.
• Faked receipt: The voter could claim to be disenfranchised by falsely
claiming a faked receipt.
4.7 WBB
• Monitoring access to the WBB: A coercer with access to the the web server
log at the public bulletin board web site could register which ballot receipt
IDs are checked, and use this information to detect whether voters are
trying to cheat by presenting fake triplets. The web interface used to access
the WBB should therefore be implemented carefully to not reveal ballot
IDs of receipts. Similarly, a dishonest employee of a helper organisation
could sell receipts IDs. Information about which ballot IDs constitute
receipts, together with the scheme’s logics for filling out multi-ballots,
could also be used to match ballots from the WBB in order to re-construct
valid multi-ballots. In [23] several such successful attacks are described
with various simulated election races.
• Voter presented with fake WBB: A false WBB could be shown to mislead
a voter into believing that her receipt has been correctly recorded when
in fact it has not.
• WBB modified: The WBB should be a write-only medium, but this seems
hard to enforce in practice. There is a risk that the WBB could be modified
after the voter has checked her receipt at the WBB.
• Denial of Service: DoS attacks are a possible threat.
5 Threat Analysis Case Study: Preˆt a` Voter’05
5.1 Outline of the Preˆt a` Voter Scheme’05
We now present a brief outline of the Preˆt a` Voter’05 scheme, for full details see
[8]. Once registered in the polling station, voters select a ballot form, sealed in
an envelope, at random. A typical example is shown below.
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In the isolation of the booth, the voter makes her selection by placing a
cross in the right-hand (RH) column against the candidate of choice. The left-
hand (LH) column that carries the candidate list is discarded, leaving the ballot
receipt. In this case, voting for Thor, the receipt would appear as follows:
X
7rJ94K
The voter then leaves the booth and casts her vote in the presence of an of-
ficial: the receipt is placed under an optical reader, or similar device, to record
the cryptographic value at the bottom of the strip, and the numerical repre-
sentation of the cell into which the cross has been entered. The voter retains a
digitally signed, hard copy of the right hand strip (RHS) as her receipt.
The candidate list on the ballot forms is randomised. Thus, with the left
hand strip (LHS) removed and without knowledge of the appropriate crypto-
graphic keys, the RHS does not indicate which way the vote was cast. A nice
side-effect of using a randomised candidate list is that a random order does not
favour any of the candidates, wheras a fixed candidate list may influence voters
to vote for candidates that are listed early.
The cryptographic value printed on the bottom of the receipt, the “onion”,
is the key to extraction of the vote. Buried cryptographically in this value, is
the seed information needed to reconstruct the candidate list. Thus, only a
threshold subset of tellers holding the appropriate keys are able to reconstruct
the candidate order and so interpret the vote value encoded on the receipt.
Once the election has closed, the receipts are transmitted to a central tabu-
lation server which posts them to a secure Web bulletin board (WBB). This is
an append-only, publicly visible facility. Only the tabulation server can write to
this and, once written, anything posted to it will (in theory) remain unchanged.
A voter can visit the WBB and confirm that her receipt appears correctly.
After a suitable period to allow voters to check their receipts, the tellers
perform a robust, anonymising, decryption mix on the batch of posted receipts.
The paper receipt allows voters to prove the absence or corruption of their
receipt in the event that it fails to appear correctly on the WBB.
Various mechanisms are deployed to detect and deter any corruption in the
construction of the ballot forms. The approach suggested in [8] is to perform a
random pre-audit of the ballot forms.
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6 Threat Analysis of Preˆt a` Voter’05
6.1 Ballot form
• Identifiable information added by voter/official: Not a threat as the LHS
is detached and the RHS only states the onion and the voter’s mark.
• Voter identifiable from ballot form: Only the numerical value of the voter’s
mark and the corresponding onion are recorded to the WBB, so unless the
correspondence between onion and candidate order is leaked, the voter will
not be able to prove how she voted. A voter could e.g. prove her vote by
retaining the LHS. Possible mitigations are:
– Enforcing destruction of the LHS in front of an official. However, the
official may learn the correspondence between onion and candidate
order and give away the information.
– Mechanical destruction of the LHS, though this could be difficult to
carry out in practice.
– Having decoy LHS freely available in the booth. However, an adver-
sary could mark decoy strips in a subtle way. A coercer may also be
able to arrange that only “dummy” strips with a particular candidate
ordering are available.
• Voter’s choice incorrectly represented: A possible threat if the onion is
not a true encryption of the candidate order. Suggested mitigations are
as follows:
– Voter casts dummy votes. Given the RHS and associated onion,
return the candidate she selected.
– Return the seed and run a checking algorithm for well-formedness.
The problem with the first method is that it is only a partial check of the
ballot form construction. In addition tellers working in collusion, could
return a fake candidate ordering. The second method is more thorough,
but is only available to auditors. It is important to ensure that ballot forms
are not re-used once they have been used for checking. Another possibility
is to use an offline auditing mechanism, where audit information is posted
on the ballot forms but concealed with a scratch strip [5].
A better solution might be for the voter to verify the construction of the
ballot she actually uses to vote. One possibility is the use of two-sided
ballot forms, where the voter can verify correct construction of one of the
sides, while using the other ballot side to vote. This adds a “cut-and-
choose step”: since the voter can check an arbitrary side, there is greater
assurance that the other side is also correct [21].
Another possible threat is invalid decryption of receipts. However, this
will, with a high probability, be caught during randomised partial checking
(RPC) [12].
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• Authority knowledge: Information could be leaked during storage and
distribution, or later, once receipts have been posted to the WBB. Dis-
tributed generation of ballot forms has been proposed as a countermeasure
in [21]. However, onion and candidate list correspondences could still be
revealed by tellers acting in collusion.
• Ballot form spoiled: A ballot form could be spoiled by a dishonest election
official, e.g. by adding additional marks to a ballot form or physically de-
stroying a ballot form. Another threat is that the onion could be modified
during scanning to the WBB. All of these attacks would be detected if
voters check their receipts, but a dishonest election official could initiate
a DoS attack in this way.
• Ballot form faked: Fake ballot forms can be constructed with knowledge
of the tellers’ pulic keys. A possible countermeasure could be publicise a
list of valid onions before the election starts, such that fake ballots could
be removed from the WBB. A badly constructed fake ballot could also
be used to initiate a DoS attack, as this would be caught during RPC
of the mixing/decryption phase with high probability. However, ballot
stuffing attacks should be difficult to carry out as the casting of ballots is
supervised, so in principle, a voter is only able to cast one vote.
6.2 Voting booth
• Voter’s activity monitored: The voter could be monitored by a hidden
camera in the booth.
• Voter records own choice: A camera phone could be used to record the
voter’s choice.
• Voter choice influenced: There could be a subliminal message in the booth.
• Voter smuggles out unmarked ballot: Chain voting attacks are a threat
as the coercer can control how the voter votes by checking the WBB for
the corresponding onion. A countermeasure proposed in [20] is to cover
the onion with a scratch strip and not reveal the onion before the tallying
phase.
6.3 Ballot storage
This has not been specified in Preˆt a` Voter, but the device would presumably
record receipts, e.g. by writing to a disk and transmitting immediately to the
WBB.
• Ballot stuffing: Extra votes could be recorded by a faulty/malicious device.
• Ballot spoiling: Recorded data could be lost or corrupted. In addition, the
disks could be substituted by a malicious party. However, if voters verify
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their receipts at the WBB, in combination with a VEPAT mechanism such
errors will be detected.
6.4 Election results
• Early publishing: Tallying and publishing of final results to the WBB
should be synchronised.
• Absence of verifiability: Not a threat, unless there is a DoS from the WBB.
• False/erroneous count: The risk of an erroneous count should be minimal
as there are various mechanisms to verify decryption and tallying of votes.
6.5 Voting device
• Identifiable information added by device: Not a threat, as the device only
scans the receipt.
• Voter’s activity monitored: A possible threat (e.g. via wireless connection),
but as long as the crypto primitives used in the ballot form construction
remain secret, the voter’s choice cannot be learnt from the RHS scanned
by the device.
• Faulty authorisation: Not a threat, as the device does not authorise the
voter.
• Voter choice incorrectly/not recorded: A possible threat, but would be
discovered if voters are diligent in checking their receipts on the WBB. The
use of a VEPAT mechanism or helper organisations are countermeasures
as well.
• Denial of Service: Device failure is a threat, but the voter does not face
the possibility of losing her vote if unable to scan her receipt, as may be
the case with some electronic schemes.
6.6 Verifiable receipt
• Voter identifiable from receipt: Randomisation attacks are a threat. An
attacker could, for example, require that the first candidate is marked,
regardless of which candidate ordering is used. The level of threat is
determined by the extent a voter can pick a ballot of her own choosing and
the number of candidates in an election. In the case of few candidates, it
might be easy for the voter to pick a ballot where she can vote as she wishes
while satisfying the coercer. A randomisation attack may benefit the low
key candidates as the votes will be spread evenly across the candidates.
• Authority knowledge: Kleptographic channels [11] are a threat, i.e. crypto
variables chosen in such a way as to leak information to a colluding party.
In Preˆt a` Voter’05, this is possible by choosing a seed value such that a
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keyed hash of the onion value reveals the candidate order. However, this
would require a great deal of searching. In Preˆt a` Voter’06 [21] distributed
creation of ballot forms is suggested as a possible countermeasure against
kleptographic attacks.
An important advantage with the Preˆt a` Voter scheme is that the voter
does not need to communicate their choice to any device, and as such
subliminal or semantic channels are not threats.
• Discarded receipts/surrendered receipts: May indicate receipts that will
not be checked and hence could be altered without detection. A possi-
ble countermeasure is a verifiable encrypted paper audit trail (VEPAT)
mechanism [19].
• Invalid signature: A possible threat if the mechanism for digitally signing
receipts is malicious/fails; this also applies to the mechanism for check-
ing the signature on the receipt. The voter is then unable to prove an
incorrectly recorded receipt.
• Faked receipt: A voter could falsely claim to be disenfranchised with a
fake receipt. This could be mitigated by using signatures as proof of
authenticity of the receipts.
6.7 WBB
• Monitoring access to the WBB: There is a risk that the WBB could be
modified after the voter has checked her receipt and prior to the randomis-
ing mix phase. Although specified as a write-only medium, this is difficult
to enforce in practice. Fraud will be detected if voters verify their receipts
more than once, but voters may be reluctant to do so. As mentioned be-
fore a helper organisation in combination with a VEPAT may help ensure
the integrity of the WBB.
• Voter presented with fake WBB: The voter could be presented with a fake
WBB, e.g. in a spoofing attack, and be misled into believing her vote has
been recorded correctly when in reality it has been changed.
• WBB modified: The integrity of the scheme is dependent on a certain
percentage of voters verifying their receipts at the WBB. According to
Carl Ellison [9]: “if there is a human step that is optional, then one can
assume the human will not perform it. Some will and some won’t, but
for the purpose of security analysis, one must assume the worst case.” It
is interesting to note that if only one ballot in 100 is altered and only
1 voter in 100 bothers to check, then this would imply that only 1 in
10000 will find an error. A suggested mitigation is to have a VEPAT
mechanism [19] in place, and for independent authorities to check the
correspondence between the receipts and the contents of the WBB.
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• Denial of service: A possible threat, e.g. due to network overload or power
failure. DoS may also be an issue if a decryption mix net is used, e.g. if
the tellers keys are corrupted/deleted. As discussed in [21], the advantage
of a re-encryption mix is that faulty tellers can be removed if necessary.
However, continued assurance of voter anonymity would need to be taken
into consideration.
7 Final Remarks
In the following we discuss the main results of applying the model defined in
[22] to analyse the ThreeBallot voting system and Preˆt a` Voter. The main
purpose of the case studies was to demonstrate that the model could be used
for a systematic analysis of two rather different schemes. Below we discuss
the main threats identifed in the two schemes and categorise the threats with
respect to which security requirements they violate, i.e. confidentiality, integrity
and availability.
7.1 The ThreeBallot Voting System
To ensure confidentiality in the ThreeBallots scheme it is important that once
the multi-ballot has been split into three ballots in the voting booth, it should
not be possible to link them at the WBB later. This is to avoid vote buying
or coercion. However, as the analysis shows, it may be possible to link corre-
sponding ballots in several ways, e.g. by remembering the ballot IDs, marking
the candidate choices in a special way (the “Italian attack”), adding identifiable
marks to the ballots, or by trying to reconstruct multi-ballots by matching bal-
lots posted to the WBB. Another threat to confidentiality is registering which
ballot IDs constitute receipts. This information can be used to verify voter be-
haviour, e.g. making it harder for a voter to present a “fake” triplet of ballots
to the coercer.
Threats to the integrity of the scheme include all threats that may violate the
principle that the final count should accurately reflect the true intention of the
voters. Examples include ballot modifications, ballot faking, or tampering with
the election results. A possible weak point is in the phase after the ballots have
been checked through the checker machine. Here a voter or dishonest election
official could try to add marks or delete marks from a multi-ballot after it has
been verified. Including checksums on the original markings is mentioned as
a possible countermeasure. Another threat to integrity is verifying two multi-
ballots through the checker machine and combining them to one “badly” formed
multi-ballot. Fake ballots could be obtained by falsifying the red stripe printed
by the checker device. However, this attack would also require unauthorised
access to the ballot box and would be detected at the WBB, if the number of
votes differed from the number of registered voters. An important requirement
to ensure integrity is that the voter should cast exactly three ballots. A voter
can, for example, steal votes from the candidates she does not prefer by only
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casting two ballots into the ballot box.
Threats to availability include DoS attacks against the checker device, ballot
spoiling attacks and denying access to the WBB. While the scheme advocates
transparancy, e.g. by posting the names of all who voted and all the ballots to the
WBB, it may make it easier to launch DoS attacks. A dishonest election official
could add ballots such that the number of ballots does not correspond with the
number of voters. Another possible approach is to deliberately spoil receipts to
get a number of voters to complain about incorrectly recorded receipts.
We identify some interesting trade-offs in the scheme. A countermeasure
against the remembering of ballot IDs is to make them harder to remember,
e.g. by using a bar code or mixing fixed noise with the ballot ID. Although,
these approaches make it more difficult for the voter to remember the IDs of
the ballots, it also makes the verification against the WBB harder. Another
intersting trade-off relates to the simplicity of the checker machine. Ideally,
the checker machine should be a stateless memoryless machine that only checks
if a multi-ballot has been correctly formed or not. A more complex machine
may thwart some of the attacks above, e.g. by authorising the voters or adding
checksums to the ballots. On the other hand, a more complex checker is more
vulnerable to tampering, since malicious software could be used to learn and
communicate the ballot IDs of three ballots.
ThreeBallots achieves voter verifiability and unconditional privacy, i.e. pri-
vacy that relies neither on trusted third parties, nor on computational in-
tractability assumptions (e.g. hardness of factoring). The scheme may not be
practical as it stands, but is of immense theoretical importance as it demon-
strates that it is possible to design a verifiable scheme with unconditional privacy
without use of cryptography.
7.2 Preˆt a` Voter
In Preˆt a` Voter the confidentiality of the scheme is dependent on keeping the
candidate order and onion correspondence secret. Threats to confidentiality
include authority knowledge, chain voting, the voter retaining the LHS and
kleptographic attacks. However, several mitigations have been suggested against
most of these threats: distributed generation of ballot forms to counter authority
knowledge and kleptographic attacks; scratch strips to mitigate chain voting
attacks; and “dummy” LHS strips available in the booth to make it more difficult
for the voter to prove how she voted. Preˆt a` Voter is vulnerable to randomisation
attacks, but the impact on the election results may be limited, since the coercer
cannot directly choose which candidate the voter votes for. However, low key
candidates may benefit from the attack, if the votes are spread more evenly
across the candidates.
Threats to the integrity of the scheme are largly related to the onion not
corresponding to the candidate list. This means that the voters’ choices are not
correctly recorded. Voters can however verify the correctness of ballot forms
by casting dummy votes, or using a two-sided ballot form approach, where the
voter verifies a random side and uses the other side to vote. Other threats to
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integrity include fake WBBs and the fact that the WBB could be modified after
the voter has verified her receipt.
The availability of the scheme may be violated through ballot spoiling or
faking attacks, or deletion of mix adminstrators’ keys. The latter threat is
especially true for the “classic” version of Preˆt a` Voter which uses decryption
mixes. A ballot spoiling attack could be a method to launch a DoS attack, since
this would be discoverd during randomised partial checking of the mix net.
Preˆt a` Voter is robust against most threats when considering the various
countermeasures proposed for the scheme. A possible trade-off by introducing
those countermeasures is a higher level of complexity that may weaken the
voters’ understanding of the system.
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